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A zealOUS legalist would argue that Russia, or rather its predecessor the Soviet Union, has repeatedly demonstrated its inclination to use armed force in 
the absence of an actual attack against itself. Precedents that would likely be cited 
include the "Winter War" of 1939-40 against Finland, and the interventions in 
Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Some might add the deployment 
to Afghanistan in 1979 oc, in paradoxical contradistinction to those examples. the 
Wehrmacht attack against the USSR which was launched in 1941, at least as 
claimed by Nazi leaders and some contemporary historians, to forestall an immi-
nent Red Army assault. 
Whatever the merits of those alleged precedents, in its declaratory policy and 
formal acts, the Soviet Union abided by a rather narrow, or restrictive, interpreta-
tion of the principle of non-use offorce. It acceded to the Treaty for the Renuncia-
tion of War (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) of 19281 and was a party to the Convention 
for the Defini tion of Aggression of 1933.2 Although the latter might seem a less 
classical source, Justice Jackson in his opening address fo r the United States at the 
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Nuremberg Military Tribunal described it as "one of the most authoritative 
sources of international law on this subject."3 
In a conspicuous departure from the Soviet-era official and doctrinally strict, 
i.e., narrow, interpretation of the right of self-defense, Russian officials have, since 
2002, increasingly been indicating that it might be permissible to use armed force 
against extraterritorial sources of imminent threat to Russian securi ty, even in the 
absence of an actual armed attack originating from those sources. Those state-
ments, made by politicians, senior military commanders and ultimately by the 
president, were enthusiastically endorsed by a handful of Russian legal academics.4 
The qualifier that usually accompanies the term "use offorce" is "preventive," and 
Russian official statements do not seem to be sensitive to nuances of meaning be-
tween that and other adjectives, such as "preemptive," or "anticipatory," or "inter-
ceptive. "5 As to the location and nature of the sources of those threats and the 
targets of the preventive use offorce, while earlier declarations announced an in-
tention to engage them globally,6 their personality notwithstanding, eventually the 
declarations came to express a readiness to deal with sources of terrorist threats in 
the space adjacent to the Russian territory. 
The earlier remarks that caught international attention had been made in July 
and August 2002 by Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov and other military command-
ers, and several ranking parliamentarians. These statements, incidentally, were 
made soon after President George W. Bush broached preemption in his com-
mencement address at the US Military Academy.7 
Those statements were prompted by the events that occurred on the Russian-
Georgian border. Russia claimed that Chechen insurgents found refuge in the 
Pankissi Gorge in Georgia, an area where Georgian law and order was nonexistent. 
The area was convenient for insurgent rest and recreation, and to regroup and re-
enter Russian territory. Those allegations had been vehemently denied by Geor-
gian authori ties, although apparently the US "Train and Equip" mission to 
Georgia8 had, as one of its principal objectives, the establishment of viable indige-
nous law-enforcement units that could regain control over the mountainous and 
hard-to-reach Pankissi Gorge area. Russian politicians asserted that even though 
Georgian authorities could not be implicated beyond doubt in providing shelter to 
insurgents, they definitely lacked the capability and determination to deny access 
to and freedom of insurgent activity in the area. 
President Putin in his statement on September 11,2002 commemorating the 
victims of the 9/11 terrorist attack against the United States looked for legal sup-
port for the Russian position. He said that "should the Georgian leadership be un-
able to secure the area adjacent to the border and continue to ignore the UN SC 
Resolution 1373 of28 September, 2001 ... ,we shall reselVe the right to act in 
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accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter that entitles every member-State of 
the Un ited Nations to enjoy an in herent right to individual or collective self-
defense. "'I President Putin went further and instructed the uniformed services to 
draft engagement plans "to pursue terrorists and destroy their bases that have been 
reliably located and identified."lu 
That statement by President Putin prompted an angry response from the Coun-
cil of Europe whose Parliamentary Assembly insisted that "Article 51 of the UN 
Charter and Resolution 1269 (1999 ) of the UN Security Council, as well as Resolu-
tion 1368 (2001) of the UN Security Council of 12 September do not authorize the 
use of mili tary force by the Russian Federation or any other State on Georgian ter-
ritory."ll It further called on the Russian authorities to refrain from "launching any 
military action on Georgian territory as expressed by the President of the Russian 
Federation on 11 September 2002 ."12 
Not only was the Parliamentary Assembly's declaration rather unfair to Presi-
dent Putin , it was also inaccurate. The Russian president looked to Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1373 for authority, and that reference was conspicuously ignored by 
the Council of Europe. It should be recalled that Resolution 1373 specifically urged 
UN member-States to deny terrorists movement across borders and to ensure that 
refugee status is not granted to persons suspected of terrorist activity. 13 Russia was 
concerned that Georgia was unable or unwilling to abide by those and other provi-
sions of the resolution. Additionally, President Putin had not ordered that imme-
diate military action be undertaken on the territory of a sovereign State. Rather, he 
ordered that contingency plans be made, conditional on Georgia's capacity to ef-
fectivdy control its own territory. 
Putin's statement may also be interpreted as an implicit extrapolation, whether 
conscious or not, of the right of hot pursuit from the realm of the law of the sea 14 to 
trans-boundary law-enforcement. His phrase about "pursuit of terrorists" obvi-
ously alluded to situations when culprits would be pursued and apprehended, or 
accounted for, either on the Russian terri tory, or, pursuit having commenced on 
the Russian territory and continued across the border, on the territory of an adja-
cent State. IS It is also worth noting that the Russian president construed Article 51 
of the UN Charter as entitling a State to the right of self-defense against an armed 
attack by actors other than a State. 
It is true that Article 51 does not unequivocally refer to a State as a perpetrator of 
an attack; however, if one were to accept that "Article 2 (4) explains what is prohib-
ited, Article 51 what is permitted," 16 and Article 2 (4) refers to relations between 
members of the United Nations, that is, States, then Article 51 should apply to 
States, too. It should be recalled that in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Conse-
quences of the Construction of a Wall in the OCCllpied Palestinian Territory, the 
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International Court of lust ice uttered a dictum, albeit argumentative, that "Article 
51 of the Charter recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the 
case of armed attack by one State against another State."17 
While suspected terrorist bases in certain neighbor ing countries and prospec-
tive targeting of those bases have been a recurring theme in remarks by Russian se-
nior officials since 2002, most often they have not been country-specific. 18 
In most instances, the statements describing situations that would justify the 
employment of the armed forces beyond Russian territory to preempt an attack are 
related to a terrorist threat. Occasional references to threats to lives and securi ty of 
large numbers of Russian citizens or a "Russian -speaking population" imply mili-
tary support for their evacuation from a zone of an armed conflict or a hwnanitar-
ian disaster. Even fewer statements are also made that it is admissible to use force 
preemptively to meet the demands of unspecified "Russian interests" o r of its alli-
ance commitments. 
The declared targets of forceful action are individual terrorists, organized 
groups of terrorists and their bases. The means to be used in a preemptive strike 
against those targets are almost unrestricted, nuclear arms being the only clear ex-
ception. According to the defense minister, such a strike would not amount to full-
fledged combat action, but would be delivered " to avert a single terrorist threat." 
As to the geography of preemptive action, it is realistic to look at areas adjacent 
to Russian territory. An utterance by the chief of the General Staff that those strikes 
could be delivered "anywhere on the globe"19 appeared inconsistent with the state-
ments of the commander-in-chief addressing " interdiction of organized terrorist 
groups attem pting to penetrate our terri tory" and "pursuing and engaging terror-
ists. "20 
Official declarations always underscored that Russian forces will target terror-
ists and their infrastructure, rather than persons and institutions of a sovereign 
State on whose territory the former fo und refuge. Whether done consciously or 
not, this seems to be an attempt to stave off prospective charges of committing an 
act of aggression. It is worth noting that political and military leaders never miss a 
chance to underscore that armed force would be used in str ict compliance with the 
constitution, statutes and international law. 
So far those declarations have not comprised a comprehensive official doctrine 
explaining under what circumstances and according to what criteria Russia would 
be inclined to use a military tool to meet a ripening threat. The constitution, how-
ever, addresses "an imminent threat of aggression"21 against the Russian Federation 
(Article 87.2), in which case the president shall introduce martial law by a decree. A 
decree on the introduction of martial law and a decree on the introduction of the 
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state of emergency are the only acts by the president that require approval by the 
Council of Federation; all other decrees remain his unilateral prerogative. 
The federal constitutional law "On Martial Law" describes the imminent threat 
of aggression as "activities by a foreign State (States) committed in violation of the 
UN Charter and generally recognized principles and norms of international law 
that immediately indicate that an act of aggression against the Russian Federation 
is being prepared, including the declaration of war against the Russian Federation" 
(Article 3.3).22 The legal gap is further filled by a recent federal law "On Counter-
acting Terrorism" of 2006,23 as amended, which supersedes an earlier federal law 
"On Combating Terrorism" of 1998,24 as amended. 
The new law explicitly provides for the use of armed force against targets outside 
Russian territory, on the high seas and, presumably, in international airspace. In 
this context, it does not speak about preemption; however, the broad range of tasks 
indicates that military power might be required to deal with threats that are not 
necessarily imminent. 
Terrorism is defined in very broad terms as "an ideology of violence and practi-
cal impact on the decision making by bodies of State power, bodies of local self-
government and international organizations, by way of intimidation of population 
and/or by other illegal violent actions" (Article 3(1)). The law is more specific 
when it further defines "terrorist activity" as comprising such diverse elements as 
planning, preparation, funding and perpetration of a terrorist act; incitement to 
commit a terrorist act; organizing a terrorist group; recruiting, arming and train-
ing of terrorists; complicity in planning and committing a terrorist act; and propa-
gandizing of terrorist ideology and calls to engage in it. Finally, a terrorist act is 
defined as "explosion, arson or other acts intimidating population and putting 
human life at risk of death, leading to substantial loss of property, or to other grave 
consequences, with an intent to exert impact on the decision making by bodies of 
State power or international organizations, as well as a threat to commit those acts 
with same purposes" (Article 2(3), as amended}.25 It is against those acts, or perpe-
trators thereof, or means employed to commit them that the armed forces shall be 
used under the new law. 
The law is conspicuously vague as to the outer limits of the airspace where the 
military may be ordered to engage a terrorist threat. It does not speak about inter-
national airspace. Moreover, it refers to an aircraft "not responding to radio mes-
sages from ground controllers to cease violating the rules of navigation in the 
airspace of the Russian Federation, or to radio messages and visual signals being 
transmitted by the aircraft of the Russian Armed Forces" (Article 7(2»). Unad-
dressed is the question of whether that provision could come into conflict with 
Article 3 bis of the Chicago Convention of 1944.26 
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Turning to sea space, the law refers to internal waters and the terri torial sea, as 
well as to the continental shelf and to "national maritime navigation." Obviously, 
the continental shelf may extend as far as 350 nautical miles from the baselines. As 
to "national maritime navigation," it is not immediately clear whether the law im-
plies navigation within territorial limits or extends to ships flying the Russian flag 
anywhere on the seas, with a possible exception of those chartered by foreign 
entities. 
There is no need, however, to read between the lines of the law to deduce 
grounds for the use of the Russian military against terrorist targets beyond national 
borders. Article 10 specifically addresses the issue of trans-boundary deployment 
of units, as well as engagement of targets outside Russian territory without crossing 
the border. 21 Remarkably, the law never mentions foreign terri tory as an area of de-
ployment; rather, the phrase that is used in the lead-in paragraph of Article 10.1 is 
"interdiction of international terrorist activity beyond territorial bounds of the 
Russian Federation.» 
As to internal procedures, the order to fire at terrorists from Russian territory 
will be given by the president unilaterally in the exercise of his constitutional pow-
ers as the supreme commander-in -chief. To send troops across the border, the 
president would first need to obtain consent from the Council of Federation.28 
While the original version of the law required that the president submit informa-
tion regarding the proposed strength of the unit, the areas of deployment and its 
duration, that provision was deleted by the Federal Law of July 27, 2006.29 
The law addresses "the interdiction of terrorist activity," which implies preemp-
tion due to the broad range of elements of "terrorist activity" as they are defined by 
the law. The law makes a general reference to international treaties as sources of au-
thority, along with Russian legislation, for trans-boundary employment of the 
armed forces; however, soon after the adoption of the federal law "On Counter-
acting Terrorism," Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov stated that the law by itselfpro-
vides sufficient grounds for unilateral and preemptive use of force against terrorist 
targets on foreign soil . .30 
This author is not qualified to appraise the true capacity of the Russian military 
to engage terrorists who threaten Russian citizens and assets abroad. Unfortu-
nately, however, the recent drama with Russian embassy personnel in Baghdad 
sadly proved that neither Russia nor local authorities, not even the occupying pow-
ers, were able to control the hostage crisis or save lives of internationally protected 
persons}l 
The law "On Counteracting Terrorism" lists several principles, some of which 
would sound similar to ones found in the established international law. For exam-
ple, consider the principle of "proportionality of measures undertaken to counter 
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terrorism to the level of terrorist threat" (Article 2 (2)) . One can immediately trace 
the origins of that principle back to the 1837 Caroline incident, in which the Caro-
linc, a vessel used to supply Canadian rebels fighting British rule, was captured, set 
ablaze and sent over Niagara Falls. One US citizen perished. 
Several Soviet, and now Russian, students of international law have at least ac-
knowledged the Caroline doctrine, and some have given it a careful examination.32 
While it has not been widely accepted in Russia, some of the official statements re-
garding the preemptive use of force could be construed as falling within the pur-
view of the Caroline doctrine, which, if properly adapted, could add a degree of 
legitimacy to current approaches. 
Traditionally, the most often quoted source for the Caroline doctrine has been a 
paragraph in the diplomatic note from Daniel Webster, the US secretary of state, to 
Henry Fox, the British minister in Washington, DC, dispatched on April 24, 1841. 
It is from this note that current international law derives the principles of necessity 
and proportionality.3) But we might discover no less substantive statements on 
questions oflaw in other parts of Webster's letter, as well as in a later note from 
Lord Ashburton, the British minister plenipotentiary on special mission, to Secre-
taryWebster, and in the address of President Tyler to the US Congress in the after-
math of the Caroline case.:l4 
If the Russian government were to contemplate putting into effect provisions of 
the federal law "On Counteracting Terrorism" that regulate deployment of Russ ian 
armed forces outside Russian territory, it might consider several decision-making 
guidelines on the preemptive use of force-first and foremost , necessity and pro-
portionality. Recourse might be had to Lord Ashburton's allusion to circumstances 
under which the principle of "inviolable character of the territory of independent 
nations"35 could be suspended. According to the British minister, "it must be so for 
the shortest possible period, during the continuance of an admitted overruling ne-
cessity, and strictly confined within the narrowest limits imposed by that neces-
sity."36 That limitation could be developed further to include severe restrictions on 
the choice of target, which should only be the immediate source of the threat, and 
that that source ought to be in the space adjacent to the State's own territory. The 
decision should also include consideration of the scale of the threat and the ex-
pected gravity of the consequences of inaction. 
A decisive argument in favor of a preemptive use of force would be the explicit 
consent to or request of a State on whose territory the source of the threat is located 
because that State is not capable of coping with it. It might be worthwhile to con-
sider an attack if a neighboring State, on whose soil or under whose flag on the high 
seas or in international airspace the threat is maturing, is expressly unwilling to 
control it. 
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A unilateral resort to force might have to be considered if the imminence of 
threat does not leave time to refer the issue to the United Nations Security Council 
or to a regional arrangement, or jfthere is a continual record of passivity of those 
institutions in similar situations, but in any case the Security Council will have to 
be notified to comply with requirements of Article 51 ("Measures taken by Mem-
bers in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council. ... ") of the UN Charter. That means that the existence of a threat, 
its gravity and imminence will have to be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and 
that, in turn, would necessitate the disclosure of sources and means of collection of 
information, bearing in mind that what one party would deem to be waterproof 
evidence justifying a preemptive strike, could be strongly rejected by another party. 
Resort to armed force would also be proof that other means, including diplomatic 
and law-enforcement, turned out to be ineffective, or may have been used 
unskillfully. 
A State using armed force to divert a seemingly imminent attack shall be ex-
pected to bear full responsibility for injuries and damages inflicted upon innocent 
persons and their property. A precursor for those injuries might well be inaccurate 
information about the exact location of a source of terrorist threat and its pre-
paredness for an attack. 
Finally, the location and duration of preemptive action must be clearly defined 
to the personnel involved in it, who should be given precise orders and rules of en-
gagement. No action may commence without reliable and executable plans of 
evacuation. 
Those guidelines are general and some are self-evident. They would need to be 
made specific for a particular contingency. 
Russia is not the only State that declared its intention to use, as an extreme 
means, armed force to eliminate an imminent threat of a massive terrorist attack 
and, should dire need arise, project its force beyond its borders. Of course, those 
making such statements should make sure that resolute declarations are supported 
by adequate resources and the strong will to use them. Otherwise those declara-
tions are likely to be counterproductive and self-harming. 
There is a question that could bother a zealous legalist: as more nations, some 
of them bearing enormous might, submit that they would use armed force in self-
defense not only to react to an actual attack, but also to preempt an imminent as-
sault, or even prevent it from materializing in the future, would it not give impetus 
to claims that a customary rule of international law has already been conceived?31 
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